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SHOW ME THE MONEY: DETERMINING A CELEBRITY’S
FAIR MARKET VALUE IN A RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ACTION
Cody Reaves*
As the power of celebrity continues to grow in the age of social media, so too does
the price of using a celebrity’s name and likeness to promote a product. With the
newfound ease of using Twitter, Facebook, and even print media to use a celebrity’s
identity in conjunction with a product or company, right of publicity concerns
arise. When a company uses a celebrity’s name and likeness without the celebrity’s
authorization to market or sell a product, companies open themselves up to right of
publicity suits. Many of these cases settle out of court. But when these cases do go to
trial, a unique set of problems arise when expert testimony is used to determine the
fair market value of the unauthorized use of the celebrity’s name or likeness. This
Note examines two competing methods of fair market value calculation often uti-
lized by expert witnesses, with a focus on one in particular—the hypothetical
negotiation test—and examines this test using copyright and property principles. It
concludes by arguing for a new way of viewing the hypothetical negotiation test,
and proposes that the two competing tests may not be so different after all.
INTRODUCTION**
The use of a celebrity’s name and likeness can generate substan-
tial revenue. The value of one’s name and likeness, and the right to
control it, was first recognized as a right of publicity by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1953.1 Although the right arose out of
privacy law,2 it gradually came to be viewed more as a property right
“inherent in the commercial value of a person’s identity,”3 which
then allowed one to recover damages for the economic value of the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank
the entire staff of the Michigan Journal of Law Reform for their thoughtful comments and
steadfast guidance; Jonathan Faber for his insightful and invaluable feedback; my family for
their unwavering support; and Kylie, my wife, for loving me and listening to me formulate
this Note when all she really wanted to do was rock our newborn daughter to sleep in peace.
** For ethical reasons, the author does not discuss Jordan v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, 115 F.
Supp. 3d 950 (2015) in this Note, because the matter was pending during the author’s time
as a judicial extern with the presiding judge (Hon. John Robert Blakey of the Northern
District of Illinois).
1. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (2013 ed.); Haelan
Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
2. Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute is Necessary, 28
COMM. LAW. 14, 14 (2011); see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–96 (1890).
3. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 6.3.
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unauthorized use.4 Indeed, many celebrities today have capitalized
off of their name and likeness, or parts of their likeness, to the tune
of millions of dollars.5
Likewise, companies and individuals have used the name and
likeness of celebrities without their permission—sometimes be-
cause they asked and were told no,6 and sometimes because they
simply did not think the celebrity would actually file suit.7 Gener-
ally, one’s right of publicity is violated when another “appropriates
the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without con-
sent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for
purposes of trade.”8 Numerous celebrities have brought right of
publicity suits, including Johnny Carson,9 Tiger Woods,10 and
Vanna White.11
There is no federal right of publicity, although many have advo-
cated for it.12 However, there is a trend toward states recognizing
this right—thirty-one states currently recognize a right of publicity
4. Vick & Jassy, supra note 2, at 14.
5. See Brad D. Carlson, Concerning the Effect of Athlete Endorsement on Brand and Team-
Related Intentions, 17 SPORTS MKTG. Q. 154, 154 (2008) (noting that Tiger Woods earned $87
million dollars from endorsement deals in 2006, and that his contract with Nike alone is
worth $105 million).
6. See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Jim Brown Receives $600,000 Judgment to Dismiss Lawsuit vs. EA,
ESPN (June 28, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/16589853/jim-brown-gets-600
000-dismiss-lawsuit-electronic-arts (explaining that after Brown filed suit alleging that he re-
fused EA’s request to use his likeness in the game, EA still created a Madden player that was
“similar to Brown in height, weight, skin color, experience, position and ability level.” The
two sides agreed to a $600,000 settlement.); Alanna Petroff, Pele Sues Samsung for $30 Million
Over TV ‘Lookalike’ Ad, CNN MONEY (Mar. 30, 2016, 11:32 AM), http://money.cnn.com/
2016/03/30/news/pele-samsung-advertising-lawsuit/index.html?iid=ob_homepage_deskre
commended_pool&iid=obnetwork (Pele alleged that, after the two sides failed to reach an
agreement regarding the use of Pele’s name and likeness in an advertising campaign, Sam-
sung published an ad in the New York Times showing the face of “a smiling man who very
closely resembles Pele” next to a television showing a soccer player performing a “scissors-
kick, perfected and famously used” by Pele.).
7. For an example of an individual provoking litigation in this regard, see Keith Harris,
Can Taylor Swift Sue Kanye West Over ‘Famous’ Video?, ROLLING STONE (June 29, 2016), http://
www.rollingstone.com/music/news/can-taylor-swift-sue-kanye-west-over-famous-video-201606
29 (discussing that after he used the name and likeness of Taylor Swift, Rihanna, and other
famous figures in his music video “Famous,” Kanye West tweeted: “Can somebody sue me
already #I’llwait.”).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995); see Mat-
thew Savare, The Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in Calculating Compensatory
Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004).
9. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), aff’d,
810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987).
10. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000), aff’d, 332 F.3d
915 (6th Cir. 2003).
11. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 2002).
12. See generally Vick & Jassy, supra note 2.
SPRING 2017] Determining a Celebrity’s Fair Market Value 833
by statute or common law.13 And those who have not recognized
the right would likely do so if called upon, influenced largely by the
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of a right of publicity in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.14 In Zacchini, the Court
discussed the right of publicity at length. In doing so it recognized
“what may be the strongest case for a ‘right of publicity’ involving,
not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of
the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in
the first place.”15 The closest federal analogue is the Lanham Act,
although they are “far from identical.”16
The issue discussed in this Note arises from the damages pro-
vided for under right of publicity state statutes. While the varying
state statutes create a patchwork of remedies, commonly, a violation
allows the injured party to collect either (1) actual damages; or (2)
statutory damages.17 But statutory damages are limited,18 and in the
event of a trial, it is often up to the jury to analyze how to calculate
actual damages.19 This Note narrows its focus on the methods used
to calculate actual damages.
For example, Ohio’s state statute defines actual damages as “in-
cluding any profits derived from and attributable to the
unauthorized use of an individual’s persona for a commercial pur-
pose,”20 and Indiana’s state statute allows the aggrieved to recover
“actual damages, including profits derived from the unauthorized
use.”21 The problem is that “legislatures have neither defined the
term ‘damages’ nor provided guidance in ascertaining what dam-
ages are recoverable in right of publicity cases.”22 This is further
exacerbated by the scant instructions often given by courts to guide
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id.
15. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Vick & Jassy, supra note 2, at 15 (noting, for example, that the
Lanham Act requires some element of falsity, deception, or confusion as to whether the
plaintiff is actually endorsing the defendant’s product, but there is no such requirement for
the right of publicity); but see Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., No. 8645, 1957 WL 7316, at
*11 (Pa. C.P., Phila. Cty. 1957) (holding that defendant had misappropriated plaintiff’s right
of publicity, and that “this simply is an application of the doctrine of unfair competition to a
property right entitled ‘right of publicity.’ This, therefore, is not a separate cause of action,
but rather is unfair competition under another label.”).
17. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2015); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/40
(West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.07 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1449(A) (West 2015).
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.07(A)(1)(b); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/40.
19. See generally Savare, supra note 8.
20. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.07.
21. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-10 (West 2015).
22. See Savare, supra note 8, at 151.
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juries, and the reality is that, more often than not, these cases are
not litigated; instead they are settled for undisclosed amounts, pro-
viding no guidance for future courts.23
The most obvious measure for assessing actual damages is the
fair market value of the use of the plaintiff’s identity.24 The calcula-
tion of fair market value often involves a number of factors,
including unjust enrichment, the infringer’s profits, and diminu-
tion of the future earning potential for plaintiff in licensing his or
her identity.25 Thus, once a jury has decided that actual damages
are appropriate, it is faced with another question: how do you calcu-
late the fair market value of the use of the plaintiff’s name and
likeness?
This Note focuses on answering this precise question. Part I pro-
vides an overview of the comparable uses method and the
hypothetical negotiation test, using case law to flesh out the con-
tours of each method. Part II examines why courts allow actual
damages in the right of publicity context and uses copyright and
property principles to assess the viability of the hypothetical negoti-
ation test. In particular, this Note analyzes the competing methods
through the lens of the property and liability rule distinction elic-
ited by Calabresi and Melamed, a helpful framework that is very
similar to the dichotomy between the comparable uses method and
the hypothetical negotiation test. Part III argues for a new way of
viewing the hypothetical negotiation test, and proposes that the two
competing tests may not be so different after all. The Note con-
cludes by advocating for the use of both methods in determining
fair market value in the right of publicity context, and argues that
so long as a party closely weds the hypothetical negotiation test to
concrete evidence and past transactions, these data points—princi-
pally, the buyer’s side of the negotiating table—should be
presented to the jury to consider in its analysis.
I. THE COMPARABLE USES METHOD, AND THE HYPOTHETICAL
NEGOTIATION (“WILLING BUYER/WILLING SELLER”) TEST
There are two competing methods used in determining a celeb-
rity’s fair market value under a Right of Publicity Act: (1) the
comparable uses method; and (2) the hypothetical negotiation
23. See id.
24. See id. at 151; see also J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture –
The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
129, 134 (1995).
25. See McCarthy, supra note 24, at 134.
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(“willing buyer/willing seller”) test. This Note will discuss each in
turn.
A. The Comparable Uses Method
The comparable uses method is a valuation tool used by experts
who subscribe to the market approach, which is itself a well-estab-
lished method of fair market value calculation.26 Proponents of the
comparable uses method hold that market value “can be ascer-
tained relatively easily by expert testimony as to ‘comparables’:
amounts received by comparable persons for comparable uses.”27
This value cannot be based upon speculation, but must instead be
based on comparables and reasonable assumptions.28 Using this
method, a plaintiff attempts to establish a “going rate” for his or her
services.29 For example, in Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Rig-
gins,30 an expert in the field of sports marketing testified that
plaintiff, former professional football star, John Riggins, was “a
proven commodity” who used the commercial value of his name for
endorsements.31 The expert testified as to the fee Riggins would
customarily charge for that kind of use—here, his name for the
purposes of an endorsement.32
As shown in Riggins, “[i]f the plaintiff has consented to advertis-
ing uses of his personality in the past, then he can establish the
going rate for his endorsement by reference to the fee he received
from similar advertisers in the past.”33 This type of comparable eval-
uation was also seen in Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc.. There, the
court had to determine the damages suffered by plaintiff, golf leg-
end, Ben Hogan, after defendant published a book entitled “Golf
With the Masters,” which featured, without Hogan’s permission, his
name and photograph “prominently displayed on the jacket and in
the text.”34 In determining damages, the court looked to, inter alia,
sums of money plaintiff had received from articles he had written.35
26. See Gregory J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LICENSING ROYALTY RATES
§ 1.02[A][1] (2005 ed.).
27. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11:32 (2013 ed.).
28. See id.
29. James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51
TEX. L. REV. 637, 651 (1973).
30. Town & Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E. 2d 356 (Va. 1995).
31. Id. at 364.
32. Id.
33. Treece, supra note 29, at 651.
34. Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., No. 8645, 1957 WL 7316, at *1 (Pa. C.P., Phila.
Cty. 1957).
35. Id. at *14.
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Taking into account a number of comparable uses,36 the court
found that the fair market value of the use by defendant was $5,000
dollars.37
In contrast, if the plaintiff has never consented to advertising
uses of his or her personality, then he can establish the going rate
by reference to endorsements by celebrities of his stature.38 This
was the approach taken by the court in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/
ABC, Inc.39 Because plaintiff, Dustin Hoffman, a movie star, had
“scrupulously guided and guarded” the use of his name and like-
ness, ABC’s unauthorized use was the first time Hoffman’s name
had been used outside of the movie context.40 Hoffman filed suit
against ABC, Inc., the owner of Los Angeles Magazine, Inc., after
the March 1997 issue of Los Angeles Magazine featured a photograph
of Hoffman without his permission.41 The doctored photograph
showed plaintiff in articles of clothing created by designers who
were major advertisers in Los Angeles Magazine, and the accompany-
ing article referenced a “shopping guide” that provided price and
store information for the clothing.42 Plaintiff did not grant permis-
sion for the use of his name and likeness, and also did not consent
to commercially endorse any fashion designer.43
The court found that plaintiff’s statutory right of publicity had
been violated.44 The California Right of Publicity statute stated:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, [or]
signature . . . for purposes of advertising or selling [merchan-
dise] . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition . . .
the person . . . shall be liable . . . in an amount equal to the
greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual
damages suffered by him or her as a result of the unauthorized
36. Id. (considering the sums the author earned from other magazine publications, in-
cluding from Reader’s Digest, London Sunday Express, Cowles Magazine, Saturday Evening
Post, This Week, and Look, when determining the plaintiff’s damages).
37. Id. at *15.
38. Treece, supra note 29, at 651.
39. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev’d on
other grounds, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversed on First Amendment grounds).
40. Id. at 870, 872.
41. Id. at 869–71 (explaining that defendants used computer imaging software to ma-
nipulate a photograph of plaintiff to make it appear as though he was wearing “a
contemporary silk gown designed by Richard Tyler and high–heel shoes designed by Ralph
Lauren”).
42. Id. at 870.
43. Id. at 871.
44. Id. at 873.
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use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attrib-
utable to the use and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages.45
In determining actual damages, the court considered the fair mar-
ket value of the use of plaintiff’s identity.46 The court found that the
fair market value was “the value that a celebrity of Mr. Hoffman’s
reputation, appeal, talent and fame would bring in the open mar-
ket for this type of one-time use in a publication in a regional
magazine, in the Los Angeles market area.”47 In making this deter-
mination, the court considered five factors: (1) stature of the
celebrity; (2) the first-time use of plaintiff’s name in a non-movie
promotion context; (3) plaintiff’s perception of the impact the use
would have on his future earning potential; (4) uniqueness of the
role and character that plaintiff was portraying in the picture that
was used (the movie, Tootsie); and (5) the area to which the maga-
zine was distributed.48
As demonstrated by the cases above, when available, the compa-
rable uses method, or the “going rate,” offers an objective way to
measure the fair market value of the use of the plaintiff’s identity.
However, another method that allows for more subjectivity, the hy-
pothetical negotiation test, is emerging in the courts.
B. The Hypothetical Negotiation
(“Willing Buyer/Willing Seller”) Test
The hypothetical negotiation (“willing-buyer/willing-seller”) test
is best explained through a discussion of cases that help flesh out its
contours. However, the definition used in the federal tax context
sets the table for the discussion to follow. For federal tax purposes,
the fair market value of an asset is “the price at which the [asset]
would change hands between a willing buyer and willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”49
When first formulated, the voluntary nature of the negotiation
was not clearly established by the case law. In Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v.
Minnesota Moline Plow Co., a case where a patentee could not prove
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2015); see Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
46. See Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 872, 875 (finding the fair market value of the right to utilize plaintiff’s
name and likeness in the manner it was used to be $1,500,000).
49. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170-1(c)(2) (2015).
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lost profits, the Court stated that the patentee could show the value
of the use by “proving what would have been a reasonable royalty,
considering the nature of the invention, its utility and advantages,
and the extent of the use involved.”50 In the absence of an estab-
lished royalty, the Court found that the proper measure of damages
was “such sum as . . . would have been a reasonable royalty for the
defendant to have paid.”51 This was an amount that the jury had the
authority to decide.52
Relying on the framework set forth by Dowagiac, the courts soon
refined the standard by importing the idea that a reasonable price
is one that neither party is obligated to accept. This new approach
was initially pronounced in Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co.,
100 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1938).53 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held as follows:
In fixing damages on a royalty basis against an infringer, the
sum allowed should be reasonable and that which would be
accepted by a prudent licensee who wished to obtain a license
but was not so compelled and a prudent patentee, who wished
to grant a license but was not so compelled. In other words,
the sum allowed should be that amount which a person desiring to
use a patented machine and sell its product at a reasonable profit
would be willing to pay.54
A more simplistic phrasing was later pronounced by the Ninth Cir-
cuit: “The primary inquiry, often complicated by secondary ones, is
what the parties would have agreed upon, if both were reasonably
trying to reach an agreement.”55
This test was further clarified by the court in Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), finding
that this test “requires consideration not only of the amount that a
willing licensee would have paid for the patent license but also of
the amount that a willing licensor would have accepted.”56 In a re-
cent copyright case, the Federal Circuit Court applied this test and
reversed the trial court, stating it is “incorrect in a hypothetical ne-
gotiation inquiry for a court to limit its analysis to only one side of
50. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915).
51. See id. at 648–49.
52. See id. at 649.
53. See Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
54. Id. at 335–36 (emphasis added).
55. Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1952).
56. Georgia-Pacific Corp v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
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the negotiating table.”57 On remand, the trial court was instructed
to “consider all evidence relevant to a hypothetical negotiation.”58
In short, the court’s task is to determine the “reasonable . . . fee on
which a willing buyer and a willing seller would have agreed for the
use taken by the infringer.”59 This is the foundation of the hypo-
thetical negotiation test used in right of publicity cases.
Because the cases discussed above occur in the copyright and pat-
ent context, it may appear that there is no need to consider their
concerns in the right of publicity context. However, at least one
court has already allowed for the hypothetical negotiation test to be
used in a right of publicity case.60 The use of the hypothetical nego-
tiation test in right of publicity actions is further supported by the
concerns expressed by the Second Circuit in a copyright case, On
Davis:
Furthermore, the fair market value to be determined is not the
highest use for which plaintiff might license but the use the
infringer made. Thus, assuming the defendant made infring-
ing use of a Mickey Mouse image for a single performance of a
school play before schoolchildren, teachers and parents with
tickets at $3, the fair market value would not be the same as
the fee customarily charged by the owner to license the use of
this image in a commercial production.61
Many of the court’s concerns here are analogous to those underly-
ing an award of actual damages, which involves a fair market value
calculation, in right of publicity actions. The in-depth discussion of
Bogart, infra Part III.A, helps to clarify this test’s application in right
of publicity cases.
Based on these two methods, a problem in need of a resolution
emerges: What data points should be used when determining a ce-
lebrity’s fair market value? By allowing for the use of the
hypothetical negotiation test, the fair market value of the property
right reflects the subjective value placed on that right by a particu-
lar buyer. Such an analysis is based on hypothetical, arms-length
negotiations, instead of focusing solely on established, completed
57. Gaylord v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
58. Id. at 1344.
59. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).
60. See Bogart, LLC v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-39, 2012 WL 3745833, at
*16 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
61. On Davis, 246 F.3d at 166 n.5.
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arms-length transactions,62 whether between that celebrity or an-
other who is similarly situated. Furthermore, the hypothetical
negotiation test fails to take into account situations where the
“seller,” the celebrity, would never have authorized use by the
“buyer” for any amount of money.63
The prospect of the shift from an objective measure to a more
subjective measure gives cause for great concern. Taking into ac-
count the growing commercialization of athletes and celebrities
through television, print, and social media, the courts will be in-
creasingly called upon to help determine actual damages—in other
words, a celebrity’s fair market value—in the right of publicity
context.
II. THE FOUNDATION FOR REFORM
In determining which data points to use in calculating fair mar-
ket value in the right of publicity context, it is first important to
establish the reason for awarding actual damages. In other words,
what are we trying to accomplish by recognizing a right of publicity
and awarding actual damages? In arriving at the answer, a look at
the calculation of fair market value in the copyright context is prag-
matic and insightful. We will also view the problem through the
lens of the property and liability rule distinction elicited by Cala-
bresi and Melamed, which parallels the differences between the
comparable uses method and hypothetical negotiation test.64
A. The “Why” Behind Actual Damages
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court
noted the difference between privacy rights and publicity rights. Al-
though both are torts, the interest being protected by the state
differs.65 In the privacy context, the interest protected is the place-
ment of the plaintiff in a false light that damages his or her
62. Gaylord, 678 F.3d at 1343.
63. For example, one can envision a hypothetical where a professional athlete with a
wholesome image or a pop star with mostly teen fans would never allow use of his or her
name or likeness for the promotion of an alcoholic beverage. In such a case, the hypothetical
negotiation test simply does not take into consideration that the plaintiff would have never
entered into negotiations for such a use.
64. See generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamad, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
65. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
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reputation.66 By contrast, in the right of publicity context, the State
is protecting “the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in
part to encourage entertainment.”67 Thus, the state’s interest is
closely related to the goals of patent and copyright law—it focuses
on the right of an individual to receive the reward, monetary or
otherwise, of his endeavors; it does not address the protection of
feelings or reputation.68 Aptly put, “The rationale for [the right of
publicity] . . . is the straightforward one of preventing unjust en-
richment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by
having the defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that
would have market value and for which he would normally pay.”69
Having set forth the reasons behind recognizing a right of pub-
licity, this Note turns now to the “why” behind a finding of actual
damages. The answer to this question is more difficult because, as
stated, supra Part I, legislatures have not defined actual damages.70
Although it did so outside of the right of publicity context, the Illi-
nois Court of Appeals relied on Black’s Law Dictionary to define
actual damages where Illinois’ right of publicity statute was silent.71
The current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as,
“[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a
proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses—also termed
compensatory damages; tangible damages; real damages.”72 How-
ever, this definition falls short. While it does describe what actual
damages are generally, further analysis is needed to understand the
meaning of the term in right of publicity cases. The lack of gui-
dance from legislatures begs for one to search closely related areas
of law for an answer. Based on the Supreme Court’s recognition of
the close relationship between the goals of copyright law and the
right of publicity in Zacchini,73 this Note looks to copyright law for
insight into the policy goals behind actual damages.
66. Id.; see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 398–401 (1960).
67. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573; see MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at § 11:32.
68. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573; but see Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th
Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court and holding that the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim
was not preempted by the Copyright Act).
69. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law and
Contemp. Prob. 326, 331 (1966); see Toney, 406 F.3d at 910 (“[T]he purpose of the IRPA
[Illinois Right of Publicity Act] is to allow a person to control the commercial value of his or
her identity . . . . The basis of a right of publicity claim concerns the message—whether the
plaintiff endorses, or appears to endorse the product in question.”).
70. Savare, supra note 8, at 151.
71. Smith, Allen, Mendenhall, Emons & Selby v. Thomson Corp., 862 N.E.2d 1006, 1009
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
72. Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
73. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
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B. A View from the Copyright Context
Although copyright cases do not uniformly support the hypothet-
ical negotiation test, the court in On Davis provides the strongest,
most straightforward support for this method of calculating actual
damages. In On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., supra Part I, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals examined damages provided for under the
Copyright Act.74 The Act states that “an infringer of copyright is
liable for either: (1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any
additional profits of the infringer . . . ; or (2) statutory damages.”75
The court noted that an award of actual damages should view the
facts from the point of view of the copyright owner.76 The lower
court held that the evidence supporting the claim of actual dam-
ages was too speculative to support such recovery, but the Second
Circuit reversed.77 In doing so, the Second Circuit stated that, on
the basis of the evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably
found that the plaintiff had established a fair market value for the
use of an image of his copyrighted design.78
The court recognized that awarding a copyright owner actual
damages could risk abuse because he or she may claim an unrea-
sonable amount as a license fee for the copyrighted design.79 The
court attempted to protect against this risk by requiring that the
amount of damages “not be based on ‘undue speculation.’”80 But
despite this protection, the court still recognized that the calcula-
tion of fair market value may involve some uncertainty, and that the
accepted methods of determining fair market value may require the
court to engage in some degree of speculation.81 In Rogers v. Koons,
the Second Circuit remanded to the district court to assess actual
damages, observing that “a reasonable license fee . . . best approxi-
mates the market injury sustained as a result of [defendant’s]
misappropriation.”82
The court in On Davis gave support for the hypothetical negotia-
tion test, stating, “[A]ctual damages may include in appropriate
74. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
76. On Davis, 246 F.3d at 159 (“[An award for actual damages] undertakes to compen-
sate the owner for any harm he suffered by reason of the infringer’s illegal act.”).
77. Id. at 161.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id. (quoting Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1985)); see
also Childress v. Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 981, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
81. On Davis, 246 F.3d at 16–67.
82. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992).
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cases the reasonable license fee on which a willing buyer and a will-
ing seller would have agreed for the use taken by the infringer.”83
The court pointed to a panoply of cases supporting the test,84 in-
cluding a case in which the Ninth Circuit approved a jury
instruction that allowed the jury to award actual damages estimat-
ing “what a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to
pay for a willing seller for plaintiff’s work.”85
However, another copyright case, Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy
Comp., cuts against the support of the hypothetical negotiation test
from On Gap.86 In Beastie Boys, the hip-hop group, Beastie Boys, pur-
sued a claim against Monster Energy arising from Monster Energy’s
creation and dissemination of a promotional video that, without
permission from the hip-hop group, used portions of “five songs
composed and recorded by the Beastie Boys as its soundtrack.”87
Monster’s advertising goal was to create “an aggressive and fun
‘brand personality,’” which would lead its consumers to associate
the company’s energy beverage with “music, action sports . . . , and
attractive girls.”88
At one point, the company’s director of music marketing had
considered approaching Beastie Boys, as he felt that the group’s
core audience was similar to Monster’s consumers; however, he de-
termined that Monster’s budget would not permit it to hire such a
popular group.89 Instead, without ever obtaining, or attempting to
obtain, permission from Beastie Boys, Monster used a total of five
portions of Beastie Boys songs in a promotional video; the songs
were from a remix that was created by a DJ.90 The DJ had the right
to offer the remix “for free as a promotional item, [but] did not
have the right to sell or license the remix” to third parties for their
use.91 The promotional video was just over four minutes long, and
Beastie Boys music played for approximately three minutes and
thirty seconds.92 Monster posted the video on its website, YouTube
83. On Davis, 246 F.3d at 167.
84. See id. at 168 (citing Encyclopedia Brown Prods., Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 25 F.
Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co.,
542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982); Curtis v. General Dynamics Corp., No. C89-566S, 1990 WL
302725, at *11 (W.D. Wash. 1990)).
85. On Davis, 246 F.3d at 168 (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 1977)).
86. See Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
87. Id. at 427.
88. Id. at 428.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 427–28.
91. Id. at 428.
92. Id. at 429.
844 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:3
channel, and Facebook page.93 The jury ultimately awarded the
Beastie Boys $1 million in actual damages on its copyright claim.94
The court instructed the jury that “actual damages means the
amount of money adequate to compensate the copyright owner for
the fair market value of a defendant’s infringing use.”95 The Beastie
Boys’ damages expert “opined that the market value of the licenses
was $100,000 per song, per side [Monster and the DJ] for each of
the five songs, a total of $1 million.”96 In reaching this number, the
expert considered a number of factors, including: (1) the amounts
paid to the Beastie Boys for other licenses; (2) the manner in which
the promotional video by Monster compared to past uses the
Beastie Boys had licensed; and (3) a five-week term of use agreed to
by the parties (this is how long the video was available on
YouTube).97
Despite Monster’s motion challenging the expert testimony, the
court found the assessment of actual damages was within the realm
of reason because it was “anchored in prices actually paid for past
licenses to play Beastie Boys’ music.”98 Other evidence also sup-
ported the award, most notably the acceptance by Beastie Boys of
$125,000 as the fair market value for the use of one of its songs in a
thirty-second trailer for the film, The Hangover Part II.99 The jury
could have easily multiplied this amount by eight—accounting for
the approximate length of Monster’s video—arriving at the $1 mil-
lion dollar figure for the comparable use of Monster’s use of the
songs as the “central part of a beverage company promotion.”100
Thus, not only does the court’s reasoning cast doubt on the validity
of the hypothetical negotiation test, but it actually promotes the
comparable uses test through its reference to prices actually paid by
past purchasers.
Extrapolating from the copyright context to the right of publicity
context, proving actual damages should require a plaintiff to use a
method of proof that satisfies two criteria: (1) the method must be
based on the fair market value of the unauthorized use at the time
of such use; and (2) the method must not be based on undue spec-
ulation. From the support for the hypothetical negotiation test,101
93. Id.
94. Id. at 427.
95. Id. at 463 (citing On Davis, 240 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2001)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 464.
101. See On Davis, 246 F.3d 152, 169 (2d. Cir. 2001) (citing Encyclopedia Brown Prods.,
Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman,
SPRING 2017] Determining a Celebrity’s Fair Market Value 845
as well as the comparable uses method,102 we see that in the copy-
right context, at least two methods are appropriate for determining
fair market value for the purposes of calculating actual damages.
But should both methods be accepted in the right of publicity con-
text? This is the question that this Note will tackle, infra Part III.
C. Calabresi and Melamed: A View from Their Cathedral
In their seminal article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed set out to provide a conceptual framework within which
the separate legal subjects of property and torts could be ap-
proached from a unified perspective.103 While the framework is
applied in the nuisance and pollution context, this framework is
helpful in analyzing the right of publicity.104
First, one must view the right of publicity as an entitlement.
While the article proffers three different reasons for deciding to
entitle a person—economic efficiency, distributional preferences,
and other justice considerations105—an in-depth defense of this rea-
soning is unnecessary for the current task at hand. Suffice it to say,
the right of publicity is a property right that is “inherent in the com-
mercial value of a person’s identity” and allows recovery for the
economic value of the unauthorized use.106 Thus, in a society that
entitles Stephen Curry to market his identity and receive money
from a buyer in return, he is wealthier and the buyer is poorer than
each would be with the converse entitlement.107
The question therefore becomes: How should we protect the
right of publicity? Should we use property rules, liability rules, or
perhaps a mixture of both? The dichotomy between property rule
and liability rules calls to mind the contrast between determining
fair market value for purposes of actual damages through the objec-
tive means of the comparable uses method and the subjective
means of the hypothetical negotiation test. An entitlement is pro-
tected by property rules “to the extent that someone who wishes to
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a
Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982); Curtis v. General Dynam-
ics Corp., No. C89-566S, 1990 WL 302725, at *11 (W.D. Wash. 1990)).
102. Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d. 424, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
103. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1089.
104. Id. at 1115–19.
105. Id. at 1093.
106. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 6:3 (2d ed); Vick & Jassy, supra note 2, at 14.
107. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1095.
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voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is
agreed upon by the seller.”108 This protection allows each of the
parties to decide how much the entitlement is worth to them—its
subjective value—and gives the seller a veto if the buyer does not
offer what the buyer believes the entitlement to be worth.
But there is an immediate problem with protecting the right of
publicity through property rules, even though it is a property right.
Through the unauthorized use, the would-be buyer has stripped
the seller of his or her veto ability. Illustratively, the unauthorized
use of a celebrity’s picture in a print ad to promote the sale of a soft
drink removes the seller’s ability to bargain and veto the deal. The
print source has already been circulated, whether in a magazine or
through social media, and the damage is done. Therefore, property
rules—at least without the aid of liability rules—are not adequate
protection, as they involve “a collective decision as to who is to be
given an initial entitlement but not as to the value of the
entitlement.”109
Because property rules alone are inadequate, this Note turns to
liability rules.110 “Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitle-
ment if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an
entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”111 Therefore, while
property rules protect the subjective value that the buyer places on
the good, a liability rule protects the objectively determined value
of the good.112 But the “objectively determined” value of the good
once again begs the question this Note seeks to address—how
should the objective value be determined? Calabresi and Melamed
recognized that “[t]his value may be what it is thought the original
holder of the entitlement would have sold it for,” and that a
108. Id. at 1092.
109. Id. at 1092. The quintessential property rule remedy is to give the owner of the
entitlement the right to an injunction to have the entitlement returned to him. The defen-
dant must either return the property or else pay the plaintiff for what was taken on terms
acceptable to the plaintiff. This is not a real option in the realm of publicity rights, since there
is arguably no way to “return” someone’s likeness once it has been misappropriated and used
in the marketplace. Id.
110. Id. at 1093 (“Most entitlements to most goods are mixed [protected by property and
liability rules].”).
111. Id. at 1092.
112. In the right of publicity context, however, it is important to note a caveat: under
liability rule protection, the infringer is essentially given the right to pry the interest away
from the holder of the entitlement, even though the owner’s reservation price might be
much higher than what the market is willing to pay for it ex ante. This might reflect more
than a simple holdout problem—it might reflect the fact that the owner of the entitlement
subjectively values the entitlement more highly than anyone else in the marketplace. Thus,
he or she could choose not to sell at all.
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holder’s complaint that he would have sold it for more will be un-
availing once an objectively determined value is set.113 Yet this cuts
the other way as well. In the right of publicity context, the unautho-
rized user’s plea that the seller would have sold for a certain
amount is futile in the face of a set value that is objectively
determined.
The comparable uses method allows us to reach an objectively
determined value by using evidence of the subjective value at which
the owner values his right of publicity—namely, the price value at
which he has sold the use of his name or likeness in the past. The
use of this method protects both the would-be buyer and would-be
seller, as it prevents the seller from claiming an amount far greater
than he has received in the past, and it prevents the buyer from
drumming up favorable terms from a supposed arms-length trans-
action. A hypothetical perhaps best illustrates this point.
Stephen Curry has sold the use of his name and likeness to
Under Armour, Degree, Brita, and Muscle Milk.114 Suppose that
each deal, per year, is worth $10 million, $8 million, $4 million, and
$6 million, respectively. If a soft drink company then attempts to
contract with Curry to use his name and likeness to promote the
sale of its sports drink, it now has several values for which Curry has
already sold his name and likeness. These values reflect the subjec-
tive value that Curry places on each use.
Complications arise when parsing the exact use that each con-
tract specifically permits, but these differences should be reflected
in the prices to which Curry ultimately agreed in the arms-length
transactions. For example, Under Armour’s contract may be for use
in all media—print, social media, and television ads, etc. The con-
tract could further require signings and appearances by Curry. The
breadth of the use, in part, reflects why Under Armour had to pay
more than Muscle Milk, whose contract may have only allowed for
use of Curry’s name and likeness on social media and in print.
Without parsing the exact use, the comparable uses method would
be simple—add the value of each of Curry’s contracts (for a total of
$28 million), and divide it by the number of contracts (4). Thus, a
future bidder, or unauthorized user of Curry’s name and likeness,
could expect to pay $7 million for the wrongful use. But, as noted
in On Davis—albeit in the copyright context—the fair market value
is not the highest or average value for which the plaintiff would
113. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1092.
114. Darren Rovell, Warriors’ Stephen Curry Signs Endorsement Deal with Brita, ESPN (Dec.
16, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/14382337/stephen-curry-golden-state-warri
ors-signs-endorsement-deal-brita.
848 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:3
have sold his name and likeness, but for the fair market value of the
use made by the infringer.115 Thus, one must look to the context in
which the unauthorized use occurred. In doing so, a jury can use
the data points of “amounts received . . . for comparable uses” to
reach a fair and just verdict regarding the fair market value of the
unauthorized use for determining actual damages.116
In the copyright context in Beastie Boys, the court found that,
based on the evidence before it, the jury was within its province to
draw the conclusion that $1 million was the fair market value of the
use by Monster. Is that the answer then? Should the court viewing a
similar question in the right of publicity context (e.g., the Curry
hypothetical) allow both the comparable uses method and the hy-
pothetical negotiation test, leaving the jury to reach a conclusion as
to the fair market value of the unauthorized use? In answering this
question, we return to the two criteria set forth, supra Part II.B—
that the method of proof used must satisfy two criteria: (1) it must
be based on the fair market value of the unauthorized use at the
time of such use; and (2) it must not be based on undue
speculation.117
This Note moves now to a final discussion of whether the hypo-
thetical negotiation test should be used to help determine fair
market value for an award of actual damages in the right of public-
ity context, and returns to Bogart, LLC v. Ashley Furniture Industries,
Inc. to illustrate the positives and negatives of allowing the test to be
used.118
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: SHOULD WE ALLOW THE
HYPOTHETICAL NEGOTIATION TEST IN THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CONTEXT?
In order to evaluate the hypothetical negotiation test, it is helpful
to use Bogart LLC v. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. to elicit the posi-
tives and negatives of the test. This Part will examine the court’s
role in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert considera-
tions, as well as whether the two methods of evaluation are really so
different from one another. Lastly, this Part will lay a framework for
how courts should view the viability of the hypothetical negotiation
test moving forward.
115. See On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001).
116. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at § 11:32.
117. See id.
118. See Bogart, LLC v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-39, 2012 WL 3745833, at
*1 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
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A. Bogart LLC: The Hypothetical Negotiation Test in Action
Bogart, LLC owned the intellectual property rights, including
the publicity rights, of the late actor, Humphrey Bogart.119 The
plaintiff alleged the defendants had used the “Bogart” mark in con-
nection with a line of furniture—including residential chairs and
sofas—branded the “Bogart Ocean” collection, and brought,
among others, a right of publicity claim.120 In the past, the plaintiff
had allowed the use of Humphrey Bogart’s publicity right on more
than one hundred occasions and in a wide variety of settings and
businesses.121 The plaintiff relied on an expert opinion regarding
the fair market value of the use, and the defendant challenged the
admissibility of the expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 and Daubert.122 The court then had to determine whether
the opinions of the expert were sufficiently reliable to be consid-
ered in the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.123
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert
testimony in federal court.124 The Rule provides that a witness who
is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue;
b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods
to the facts of the case.125
In determining whether proposed expert testimony is proper
under Rule 702, courts generally consider several factors articulated
in Daubert.126 In essence, these factors are meant to address the con-
cerns articulated in the second prong of our two-part test above,
supra Part II.C, which required that the method of proof not be




122. Id. at *13–14; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
123. Bogart, 2012 WL 3745833, at *15–17.
124. FED. R. EVID. 702.
125. Id.
126. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
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In order for expert testimony to help the jury perform its duty,
Daubert requires that “the evidence must have a valid scientific con-
nection to the disputed facts in the case.”127 Additionally, a court
may exclude expert testimony that is “imprecise and unspecific, or
whose factual basis is not adequately explained.”128 In Bogart, the
expert had worked in the celebrity talent business for over thirty
years, and had negotiated many agreements involving advertising
through commercials and other endorsement deals.129 The expert
conducted a hypothetical licensing negotiation, basing his opinion
“on his experience and heavily on precedent as to what is paid to a
particular talent.”130 In conducting this hypothetical negotiation,
the expert relied on “thousands of licensing agreements,” the gen-
eral history of plaintiff’s agreement, and a particular prior deal with
another furniture company.131 The expert further considered what
the furniture store would have paid to use the “Bogart” name, the
amount of usage, and the type of use (e.g., print, internet, and sales
materials).132
The defendant pointed out many of the problems that flow from
the use of the hypothetical negotiation test. The defendant argued
that such a test “does not entail any scientific calculus, factors to be
reviewed, or a method that can be repeated and tested.”133 How-
ever, the court rejected the defendant’s “inflexible approach [that]
would never permit expert testimony on the issue of damages in
[right of publicity cases].”134 The court noted the expert’s testi-
mony did pass the Daubert test because it was based on his more
than thirty years of experience and pointed to “concrete evidence
supporting his opinion, including evidence of how others in the
marketplace have placed a value on these intellectual property
rights.”135 In essence, the court found the expert “[did] not simply
pull a figure out of the air.”136
This, of course, is the worry that mars the hypothetical negotia-
tion test—that experts will opine regarding a hypothetical
127. Id. at 595.
128. Cook ex rel. Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1111 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004)).
129. Bogart, LLC v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-39, 2012 WL 3745833, at
*15 (M.D. Ga. 2012).




134. Id. at *17.
135. Id.
136. Id. Unsurprisingly, a settlement was reached in the case. The decision of the court to
allow plaintiff’s expert testimony, at least in part, helped to sound the death knell. See Stipula-
tion of Dismissal of Entire Action with Prejudice, 2012 WL 7760791 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
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negotiation that is not firmly rooted in facts. If this is the case, the
court should rightly impose its “gatekeeping” function to exclude
the testimony of the expert.137 But if a sufficient factual basis exists
for the testimony, then the courtroom back-and-forth between the
opposing sides’ experts could be especially helpful—indeed, in a
way, it simulates a negotiation. While it’s true that both parties have
an incentive to assert an unrealistic reservation price in the abstract,
in reality, if either side presents a figure that is too far off in the
eyes of the jury, they run the risk of losing credibility with the indi-
viduals that will decide the fair market value of the use. Thus, there
is an incentive to come up with a figure that the jury will find believ-
able and credible. The Bogart case naturally leads one to ask the
following: When utilized correctly, is the hypothetical negotiation
test really that different from the comparable uses test? This Note
turns now to that question.
B. The Dueling Tests: Are They Really So Different?
The comparable uses test is heralded for its relatively easy appli-
cation.138 All one must do is look at the amounts received by
comparable persons for comparable uses,139 or the “going rate” at
which the celebrity had sold his name and likeness for in the
past.140 Such an analysis limits its view to only the seller’s prior trans-
actions. In contrast, the hypothetical negotiation test views both
sides of the table—the prior transactions of both parties. Some may
argue that when this method is employed, the court allows a jury to
hear the amount that the particular thief would have been willing
to pay.141 But to not consider both sides of the negotiation table
could, at least in some cases, produce absurd results.142
Not all unauthorized uses are the same. As recognized by the
court in On Davis, it would indeed be perverse for a defendant who
used the image of Mickey Mouse in a school play to pay the same
amount that was paid for a past use by a national company in a
137. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“We recognize
that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occa-
sion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That,
nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaus-
tive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”).
138. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at § 11:32.
139. Id.
140. Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., No. 8645, 1957 WL 7316, at *11 (Pa. C.P., Phila.
Cty. 1957).
141. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
142. See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001).
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television commercial shown nationwide. Further, on the facts
presented in Bogart, was the hypothetical negotiation—based in
part on past sales of each party—really so different from the compa-
rable uses test? Surely the answer is no. There, the hypothetical
negotiation test was rooted in thousands of past licensing agree-
ments and Mr. Bogart’s general history of licensing the “Bogart”
mark.143
But why should courts allow the hypothetical negotiation test at
all? Courts could simply allow for the comparable uses method to
be used to establish a baseline “going rate” for the use of the plain-
tiff’s right of publicity, and then allow both parties to argue why a
jury should deviate from this baseline amount. Yet, in essence, this
is precisely what the court permits by allowing an expert to testify
using the hypothetical negotiation test. Broken down into its com-
ponent parts, the hypothetical negotiation test allows the jury to
hear (1) the price at which the plaintiff had sold his right of public-
ity in the past; and (2) the price at which the defendant has
purchased other rights of publicity in the past. Adhering to the
comparable uses method allows the jury to only hear the former.
Indeed, there would surely be cases where the comparable uses
method is all the jury needs to reach its conclusion. For instance,
returning to the Stephen Curry hypothetical,144 if a soft drink com-
pany used Curry’s name and likeness in a national television
commercial, and Under Armour had engaged in a prior transaction
with Curry for the same use, then the calculus requires little heavy
lifting. However, the inflexible nature of the comparable uses
method presents problems when, in the same scenario, the author-
ized use is for a one-page ad for a local jewelry store in a local paper
that is distributed to a mere 20,000 people. In such a case, the uses
are incomparable. Strict application of the comparable uses
method would not result in a determination of the fair market
value of the use, but rather the “highest use” of Curry’s publicity
rights.145
At the same time, the hypothetical negotiation test—by itself—
would create a perverse result in the Stephen Curry example as
well. An example from right of publicity expert, Jonathan Faber,146
helps explain why:
143. Bogart, LLC v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-39, 2012 WL 3745833, at
*16 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
144. See supra Part II.C.
145. On Davis, 246 F.3d at 166 n.5.
146. Faber is the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Luminary Group LLC, and is a
professor at Indiana University’s Robert H. McKinney School of Law. He has served as an
expert witness in right of publicity litigation throughout the United States, including cases
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One does not break into Disneyland, jump on a ride, then ar-
gue that he or she will only pay a la carte for a single ride that
lasted forty-five seconds. A person could argue that, using the
hypothetical negotiation test, the fair market value of the ride,
given its duration and how much he or she enjoyed it, is $2.75,
for example. But, obviously, a customer pays the full amount
of entry to Disney or he or she does not go. Disney has the
right to set its fee and not allow a la carte payments for single
rides. While the ride may really only cost $2.75 taking into ac-
count operation costs and various other factors, a valuation on
this basis disregards the fact that Disney has the right to deter-
mine how it operates—you pay the full fee for entry or you do
not enter the park. To decide otherwise would overlook criti-
cal dynamics that differentiate the policy underlying right of
publicity law from trademark and copyright law.147
Thus, in the Stephen Curry example, the jewelry store may urge the
court to apply the hypothetical negotiation test based on the fact
that the one-page ad was geographically limited and only featured
Curry’s name in a small font size.148 But this is the kind of a la carte
attempt that thwarts the policy underlying right of publicity law—
generally, Curry does not operate the licensing of his valuable per-
sona in this way, so “a valuation that focuses only on these specifics
is likely to miss the very essence” of Curry’s value.149
As established, supra Part I.C, there is sufficient legal support for
the hypothetical negotiation test. However, as referenced above,
one may still challenge the reliability to the facts of a particular
case. In addition to the Disneyland example above, one could envi-
sion an expert who selectively chooses data points on which to base
his or her calculation of fair market value. Yet, generally, an objec-
tion as to the factors used by an expert at the exclusion of others
goes to the weight of the expert’s opinion, not its admissibility.150
Opposing counsel would then have the opportunity to attack the
expert’s testimony through cross-examination and the presentation
of contrary evidence.151
involving Uma Thurman, the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation, Fruit of the Loom, Target,
and Nikki Sixx.
147. E-mail from Jonathan Faber, Professor, Indiana University McKinney School of Law,
to Cody Reaves, (Sept. 22, 2016) (on file with author).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596. (1993).
151. Cf. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The soundness of
the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the expert’s conclu-
sions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact . . . .”).
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C. Moving Forward: The Future of Determining Fair Market Value
in the Right of Publicity Context
The determination of fair market value in the right of publicity
context indeed presents thorny issues. The court must balance a
number of factors in deciding how to best reach the goal of com-
pensating a plaintiff for the unjust enrichment of his or her right of
publicity. Both the comparable uses method and the hypothetical
negotiation test allow a juror to obtain information to aid in their
evaluation of fair market value. Moving forward, this Note advo-
cates that, as long as a party closely weds the hypothetical
negotiation test to concrete evidence of past transactions—such
that it is not based on undue speculation—it should be presented
to the jury to consider in its analysis.
By allowing an expert to opine on the hypothetical negotiation,
the jury is presented with more data points—such as those from the
buyer’s side of the negotiating table. Such information cannot be a
detriment. Jurors who are skeptical of the arguments presented by
the defendant on the basis of the hypothetical negotiation could
simply choose to disregard the information presented by the ex-
pert. So long as hypothetical negotiation is not unduly speculative,
to not allow the jury to simply hear of the data points would be
misguided.
As stated by the plaintiff’s expert in Bogart, “[S]cientific or for-
mulaic ‘methods’ do not work in the entertainment industry, but
valuations of the use of a celebrity name and/or persona are based
on what a person is worth based on their talent, perception in the
entertainment industry, and precedential agreements.”152 Indeed,
the valuation of a celebrity’s fair market value can often be much
more complicated than the evaluation of fair market value in other
contexts. The hypothetical negotiation test allows an expert with
years of experience in a particular industry to opine regarding what
each side would have paid for a particular use.
Returning to our two-factor test,153 the method of proof used in
right of publicity cases must satisfy two criteria: (1) the method
must be based on the fair market value of the unauthorized use at
the time of such use; and (2) the method must not be based on
undue speculation.154 Issues arise on the second prong of this test,
and require that a judge use his or her expertise to determine
152. Bogart, LLC v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-39, 2012 WL 3745833, at
*16 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
153. See supra Part II.C.
154. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at § 11:32.
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whether the defendant’s expert is simply asking the court, and sub-
sequently the jury, to take him at his word. There are many
instances in which the question of undue speculation will be diffi-
cult for the court to answer, but its difficulty alone should not
prohibit the jury from hearing about data points that may aid in
their decision-making process.
Of course, in determining how much the defendant should pay
in such a case, the court must not just take the expert’s word for
it.155 An infringer could not simply state the amount they would
have paid ex ante. While the calculation of fair market value will
involve some uncertainty, such a declaration cannot be wholly un-
wedded from any past sales by either party. If both parties’ experts
anchor their opinions in the actual transactions that have taken
place, the court should have little worry that testimony will not sat-
isfy the Daubert test.
Perhaps the most pressing problem with the hypothetical negoti-
ation test is a situation where a plaintiff would never have sold his
likeness to this particular defendant at any price, or where the two
would have never settled on a price because the defendant would
never have been willing to pay what the plaintiff was asking. The
right to veto certain uses of one’s likeness156—even when offered
payment—certainly does have economic value, and being stripped
of that veto right should be compensated. But this problem has a
remedy in the form of a kind of penalty for misappropriating not
just the likeness itself, but also the right to decide how it is used. In
deciding the fair market value of such a use, courts have explicitly
acknowledged that the misappropriation of one’s identity can de-
crease the plaintiff’s future publicity value.157 In short, there is
nothing that would stop a jury from considering the abolishment of
a plaintiff’s veto right when determining the fair market value of an
unauthorized use.
Ultimately, we must rely on our trial court judges to properly as-
sume their “gatekeeper” function. In doing so, the hypothetical
negotiation test should be viewed on a continuum with varying
levels of speculation. Indeed, “the test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and
Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively
applies to all experts or in every case.”158 Of course, judges must be
mindful that a decision to allow an expert to provide an opinion
based on the hypothetical negotiation test can often foreclose the
155. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
156. See supra Part II.C.
157. Savare, supra note 8, at 164.
158. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
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case entirely, as parties, such as in Bogart, quickly settle. In essence,
a judge must guard against an “expert who supplies nothing but a
bottom line,” as he or she “supplies nothing of value to the judicial
process.”159 When an expert opinion based on the hypothetical ne-
gotiation test is based on undue speculation, the court must
“conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between
the data and the opinion proffered.”160
Looking forward, as the commercialization of athletes and celeb-
rities through television, print, and social media continues to grow,
the courts will be increasingly called upon to help determine actual
damages—the fair market value of the use of a celebrity’s name and
likeness—in the right of publicity context. In reaching such an an-
swer, courts should follow the examples of On Davis in the
copyright context, and Bogart in the right of publicity context, in
deciding that the hypothetical negotiation test is a proper method
of evaluating a celebrity’s fair market value. There is no algebraic
formula or manual to consult when determining fair market value;
rather, “[t]he expertise and perspective of the valuation expert pro-
vides the critical translation to the judge and jury of the true impact
of an infringement and the correct measure of damages.”161 This
flexible approach, provided that it is sufficiently grounded in con-
crete past transactions such that it is not based on undue
speculation, allows for a holistic view of the transaction and ensures
that juries have all relevant information at hand when calculating
fair market value.
CONCLUSION
While it may be a natural inclination to fear moving from an ob-
jective measure to a more subjective measure when calculating fair
market value in right of publicity cases, such worries are un-
founded. An exploration of the comparable uses method and
hypothetical negotiation test show that the two are not so different
after all, and may, in fact, complement one another in helping the
jury to amass a fuller understanding of the fair market value of a
celebrity’s name and likeness. This Note has proposed a new way of
viewing the hypothetical negotiation test, and advocated for the use
159. Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir.
1989).
160. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
161. E-mail from Jonathan Faber, Professor, Indiana University McKinney School of Law,
to Cody Reaves, (September 22, 2016) (on file with author).
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of both methods to determine fair market value. It argues that al-
lowing the hypothetical negotiation test, so long as it is wedded
closely to concrete evidence and past transactions, presents the jury
with more data points to consider in its fair market value analysis.
This approach would ensure that one method of calculation is not
thrown to the wayside due to its subjective nature. Most impor-
tantly, it ensures the jury has all relevant information at its disposal,
including a competing view from the buyer’s side of the negotiating
table.
